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Chapter 1
Introduction
The United Nations sprang to life, creating a commendable record, after successfully
suppressing the Iraqi aggression during the recent Gull War and restoring the peace
and security. It was then for tlie first time the world witnessed the true power of
the United Nations and realized its efficacy as a world organization in disciplining
the states" behavior to conform to the principles oi international law.
The entire machinery of enforcement of international law is controlled by the
Security Council, pursuant to the enormous powers granted upon it by the Charter
of the United Nations, thereby making the success or failure of the United Nations
a reflection of the Security Council's performance.
The Charter places primary responsibility for maintaining international peace
and security on the Security Council. The duties of the Security Council towards
maintaining international peace and security are two fold: first, to facilitate peaceful
settlements of international disputes; and second, failing a nonviolent solution, to
apply diplomatic, economic, and political sanctions, in order to restore the peace. ^
Both these functions primarily involve interpretation and implementation of
international law.
This Article comprehensively analyses the manner in which the Security council,
in the process of carrying out its functions, interprets and implements the interna-
tional legal principles set forth in the U.N. Charter. The nature of its functions
^U.N. Chs. VI and VII of the Charter. See Christopher John Sabec, The Security
Council coines of age: An analysis of the international legal response to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, 21 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 63 (1991).
1

2is such that, despite being a pohtical body, it is engaged in deahng with a variety
of issues concerning one or more principles of international law, most of which are
enumerated in the U.N. Charter, and which is discussed in the second chapter.
After a brief explanation of how the function of pacific settlement of disputes
necessitates the Security Council to interpret the international legal princi]>lcs. the
third chapter focuses on the theories of interpretation of basically the U.N. Charter,
because, Charter being an embodiment of those principles, interpretation of the
former is not possible without the interpretation of the Charter.
Tlie fourth chapter specifically analyses certain significant Charter provisions
that involve important legal principles and discusses the mode of its interpretation
l)y the Security Council. Finally, the fifth chapter explains with illustrations how
the Council applied the legal norms in a given factual situation, and enforced them.
The date of publication of all writings that have been researched for the purpose
of drafting this Article is no later than December, 1994.

Chapter 2
International Law and the Security Council
2.1 Aspects of international law within the realm of the Security
Council
'Peace' was the only dream and desire of the frustrated international society after the
disastrous world wars. Their thirst for peace culminated in the birth of the United
Nations, an organization primarily established to maintain international peace and
security. The Charter of the United Nations, wherein the principles of law for
world peace are incorporated, is given paramount importance, and is considered a
multilateral treaty or a fundamental instrument that governs the conduct of the
states that agreed to adopt those principles by attesting their signatures. It gives
form and stability to the organs, emphasizes general goals, and by its principles and
procedures maintains a balance among universal, regional, and national authorities,
and between the powers of public agencies and the rights of persons and nations. ^
The II. N. Charter consists of rules for an organization of states and for the limits
ot action on the part of their governments. These rules are cast in the form of legal
oljligations, binding on states and accepted as such by their governments. The U.N.
Charter itself is described by jurists as a multilateral convention, a treaty that is
binding law. ^
^QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 22
(i9G0).
^PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UN IN THE 1990'S 3 (1992).

4Since tlie law of international institutions is nothing but a specialized branch of
general (customary) international law upon which it rests, it is not surprising that
principles of international law are as much enshrined in the U.N. Charter as they are
in regional treaties, "^ and when the United Nations was being established, serious
attention was given to ensuring that the principles of the Charter became immutable
legal norms for all states to be strictly abided by. The Charter states in no uncertain
terms that 'the organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security. "* The Charter also affirms
basic principles of modern international law and order. ^
The new international principles of the U.N. Charter prohibits and provides for
collective measures to prevent aggressive war by states. ^ Maintaining International
peace and security, assuring ecjual rights and self determination of people, orga-
nizing international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural and humani-
tarian problems, and engaging in international actions to assure respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms are the fundamental principles emphasized by the
C'harter. Each would recjuire significant development of international law. ''
^R. A. AKINDELE, THE ORGANIZATION AND PROMOTION OF WORLD
PEACE: A STUDY OF UNIVERSAL-REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 67 (1976).
-^U.N. Charter art. 2(6). .Set WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1987). See also A. P. MOVCHAN, THE CONCEPT
AND MEANING OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 129 (1974).
'''"A major purpose of the United Nations is to assure the observance of human rights,
the self-determination of peoples, and the economic, social and cultural progress of all
uiankiud. These purposes (Preamble and Articles 1,53, 73, 76) are intended as guides to
"international cooperation' through the United Nations and the Speciahzed Agencies." See
QUINC:Y WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION
OF WAR 49 (1961).
^'GRAY L. DORSEY, BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS: CHANGING DISCOURSE
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND LAW 52 (1986).
^M at 41

5The Charter tledicated the United Nations to be "a center for hannoiiiziug the
actions of nations" in pursnit of certain common aims. Of these, the maintenance
of international peace and security is the United Nations' primary and continuing
ta.sl<.
^
The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations "declares as an 'end' of the
Ihiitetl Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,' whicii is
identical with what the preamble declares a means for this end: 'to live together
in peace with one another as good neighbors,' 'to maintain international peace and
security,' and to ensure ... that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest."
'^
With maintenance of international peace and security as the primary objective,
various principles of international law are enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, and each constitute a fundamental norm of international law, primarily
because their recognition is strengthened by the significance of the Charter and by
tlieir a.doi)tion by a vast majority of the states.
These principles include principles of individual and collective self-defense, ^"
state jurisdiction, ^^ state sovereignty and equality, which together is referred to
as sovereign equality, ^^ principle of non-intervention, ^^ and pacific settlement of
disputes. ^"*
^MOSES MASKOWITZ, THE ROOTS AND REACHES OF UN ACTIONS AND
DECISIONS 10 (1980).
*^HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (1st ed. 1950). The
formulas 'to inaintain (or further) international peace and security' or 'maintenance of
international peace and security' appear also in other Articles of the Charter (U.N. Charter
arts. 2(6), 11(1, 2), 43(1), 47(1), 48(1), 51, 52(1), 73(c), 84, 99, and 106).
^"U.N. Charter art. 51.
"U.N. CUiarter art. 2(7).
^^U.N. Charter art. 2(1).
^HJ.N. Charter art. 2(7).
^'^U.N. Charter arts. 1(1), 2(3), and chs. VI and XIV of the Charter.

6Maintenance of international peace and security corresponds to the regulation
and enforcement of the principles of international law regarding the outlawry of
war including other kinds of use of force and breaches of the peace. The League
of Nations created a new dimension to the concept of use of force and since then,
with the emphasis made by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact (1929), the Nuremberg
Charter (1945), the United Nations Charter (1945) and several other instruments,
outlawry of war gained the force of law.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter declares that, "[a] 11 members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This principle was elaborated
as a new principle of international law in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law and analyzed systematically. ^^ Although the Declaration is of itself
not a binding legal document, it is much clear that resort to war or other breaches
of the peace is a vivid violation of international law. The Security Council being
entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, is
impliedly authorized to interpret and apply, whenever necessary, the principles of
law relating to the use of force. ^^
The Ihiited Nations provides three pillars for the maintenance of peace: Peaceful
change. Pacific settlement of disputes, and Collective security. ^' Being the general
principles established by CJontemporary international law, both Pacific settlement
of disputes and Collective security contribute to the maintenance or restoration of
peace, and it is not infrequent for the Security Council to involve in these facets of
^^M. N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 685-86 (3d ed. 1991).
^•^U.N. Charter arts. 23(1) and 24(1), and the specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of its duties under this responsibihty are laid down in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
1"WERNER LEVI, FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION 86 (1950).

law whilst engaged in matters pertaining to the use of force or other breaches of the
peace. ^^ Further, the Security Council is required by the Charter to "bring about
in peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and internal i(jiial
law, adjustment and settlement of international disputes or situations whicli might
lead to a breach of the peace." Finally Article 14 states the duty to act in accordance
with international law and "the principle that the sovereignty of each state is subject
to the supremacy of international law." ^^
Article 24(2) of the United Nations Charter, in describing the functions of the
Security Clouncil, declares that the Security Council, in discharging its duties, "shall
act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." This
obligates the Security C-ouncil to conform to the principles of equal rights, self-
determination of peoples, human rights and economic, social and cultural progress of
all mankind. ^^ It also has to assure the territorial integrity, political independence
and sovereign equality of states and give due regard to the principle of domestic
Jurisdiction. ^^
Although the Security Council is required to address settlements which are pri-
marily of a political nature, it does not mean that even when it does not seek the aid
of the IC.]. it operates in isolatit)n from rules of international law . .
.,
^^ because, as
a quasi-judicial body in discharging its functions of dispute settlement, the Security
Council confronts numerous legal (questions, collectively concerning various princi-
ples of international law, like, the substantial rights and duties of the states, treaty
interpretation, etc.
I'^U.N. Charter art. 1(1).
^'^General Assembly Resolution 375(IV) of December 6, 1949.
"^"ILN. Charter art. 1, paras. 2 and 3, comprising the Purposes of the United Nations.
^^U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1, 4 and 7, comprising the Principles of the United Nations.
See WRIGHT, tiupm note 1, at 47.
^^WESLEY L. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 569
(1957).

8Thus resolution of international disputes and adoption of enforcement measures
])ro\'ide tJie Security council with ample opj)ortunity to interpret and implcnicnt
almost every facet of international law. The crucial importance of the Security
Council in world society is clear. It follows that the Security Council's significance
has had an impact on its actions.
2.2 Significance of the Security Council in the international arena
The United Nations is a political body charged with the political tasks of an impor-
tant character. The General Assembly and the Security Council are both principal
organs of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Security Council alone has the
])rimary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. ^'^
The Security Council is an organ of fifteen members. The People's Republic
of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, aiid the United States of America are its five permanent members. It derives
enormous powers from the Charter to exercise its rights and discretion while per-
forming its functions described as 'purposes' in Article 1, which are the maintenance
or restoration of peace in the international community. Dominated by the great
powers which together control most of the world's military power, it is said to have
great theoretical legal power, wliich is to be exercised with a high degree of discre-
tion. 24
At the time of the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there was an underlying assump-
tion that the party states accepted and would abide by the international law that
had been developed in the international community of nation states over the pre-
^^TAE .UN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 13 (1964).
^''QUINCY WRIGHT, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION
OF WAR 52 (I9()l).

9vious 300 years, and that they wouhl participate in developing that law as necessary
in order to achieve the purposes of the United Nations. ^^
The United Nations is based on the principle of sovereign equality of states,
but tlie scope of sovereignty has been so modified by obligations undertaken by the
nieinbers in ratifying the Charter that the principles of that instrument can be called
a "new international law." ^^
Security Council has the exclusive authority to control any violation of those
principles insofar as such violation amounts to any threat to the peace or breach
of the peace. Members and non-members are bound by the decisions taken by the
Security Council in order to maintain international peace and security. '^'
Above all, it can be argued that perhaps the most important provisions of the
Charter, is one that provides the Security Council with the general powers to take
any action it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security. ^^
^"•DORSEY, SupTu note 6, at 41.
^•^WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 7.
'^"U.N. Charter art. 25.
^'^.loseph Murphy, Dt Jure W(ir in the Gulf: Lex Specialis of Chapter VII actions prior
to. dnrnuj, and in the afterniatli of the United Nations War against Iraq, 5 N.Y. Int'l L.
Rev. 71. SO (1992).

Chapter 3
Theories of interpretation
3.1 Pacific settlement of disputes
Inlieieiit in any international dispute or a situation that is likely to erupt as a dispute
is the risk of danger to the world in the form of threat to the peace or breach of the
peace. To avoid confronting terrible consequences, it is extremely important and
necessary to settle such disputes or situation by peaceful means. With the existence
of numerous clashes of power and politics between states today, pacific settlement
of disputes is inevitable to maintain world peace, and there is no question that its
significance in modern International law has tremendously increased.
The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, constituting an effective means
to prevent breach of the peace is attached substantial importance and is strongly
favored by the Charter of the United Nations, as it has been included in its purposes
and its procedure described in chapters VI and XIV.
It is the purpose of the United Nations "to bring about by peaceful means, and
in coniorniity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace." ^ This purpose of the United Nations constitutes a function of the orga-
nization, to be carried out by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the
International Court of Justice. ^ To this function of the Organization corresponds
an obligation of the members presented as a "principle" in Article 2, paragraph 3:
HJ.N. Charter art. 1(1).
^HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1st ed. 1950).
10
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"All iiiembeis shrill settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
iiia.niiei that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered." ^
As tar as the organization is concerned, the application of "peaceful means" stan-
tlard is conhned to the settlement of only those international disputes or situations
which may endanger international peace and security. "* Further, the term "peaceful
means" has no definite meaning. Article 33 enumerates some of them, but the list is
not exhaustive; the General Assembly and the Security Council have power to add
to it, either by the combination of existing methods of settlement or by creating
precedents for new procedures. "'
The Security Council is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining of inter-
national peace and security. It thus plays a major role in ensuring that peaceful
methods of dispute settlement have been adopted by the states to prevent breach of
the peace. '* "The Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request,
make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dis-
pute." ' Also, if the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in
fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall
decide whether to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment or
to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. ^
Up to this date, a large number of international disputes or situations have been
either brought to the attention of the Security Council or voluntarily undertaken by
the Security Clouncil for resolution. But the performance of a judicial function of
disi)ute settlement by a political body like the Security Council has made crucial the
'Id.
Hl.N. Charter art. 1(1).
'•BENTWICH fc MARTIN, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 12 (1969).
''The Security Coiincil's powers and functions in this regard are enumerated in Chapter
VI of the Charter.
'U.N. CUiarter art. 38.
*U.N. Charter art. 37(1).
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(leiuarcatioii of international disputes between legal and political. The Charter itself
recognizes tlie category of legal disputes in international disputes and has framed a
(list iiict procedure for the settlement of such disputes. '^
3.2 Legal and Political disputes
In a society where states as political entities, amidst the political pressures and the
legal constraints, strive to enhance their power even at the stake of violation of law,
the blending of law and politics is a common feature of international conflicts. Thus,
as described by Lauterpacht, while "it is not difficult to establish the proposition that
all disputes between states are of a political nature, in as much as they involve more
or less important interests of states, it is equally easy to show that all international
disputes are, irrespective of their gravity, disputes of a legal character in the sense
that, as the rule of law is recognized, they are capable of an answer by the application
of legal rules." ^'^
International law and international politics are inextricably intertwined, ^^ and
as explained by D.W. Greig, "Law cannot exist in isolation from the needs of the
community it governs. In the international community, the very existence and future
development of its legal framework is dependent upon reconciling the various political
forces and pressures within the community." ^^
Despite the argument of various experts that law and politics are interrelated
to each other, the realists viewed that all international disputes are likely to be
political disputes. ^^ But according to the position taken by Hans Kelsen, "Any
conflict between states as well as between private persons is economic or political in
'^U.N.Charter arts. 92, 96 and 3G, para. 3.
i"As quoted in D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 475 (1970).
^^Detlev Vagts & Dean N. Meiiegas, World politics and international law, 82 Am. J.
liifl L. 635 (1988).
^'^GREIG, supra note 10, at 477-78.
^^TAE .UN KAHNG, LAW POLITICS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 2 (1964).
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character; but that does not exclude the possibility of treating the dispute as a legal
dispute. A conflict is economic or political with respect to the interests which are
involved; it is legal (or non-legal) with respect to the normative order controlling
these interests . . ."
''^
Nevertheless, the recognition based on the majority opinion is that political dis-
jiutes and legal disputes are interrelated to a varying degree and that law and diplo-
macy in international relations are mutually complementary, but not that the former
exclusively serves as an instrument of the latter. ^^
One more intricate issue is the determination of an international dispute, which
necessitates the understanding of the meaning and rationale ot ''legal disputes" on
international plane. Speaking before the first meeting of the Institute of Interna-
tiona] Law in 1873, Professor Goldschmidt defined legal disputes between nations as
"disputes which ought to be decided by the application of principles of law," which
included questions of territorial claims and the interpretation of treaties, but which
excluded questions of nationality, equality, or supremacy as being determined by
considerations of power and therefore political. ^''
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice reads:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stituted a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
i-^M at i.
^^Opinion of Laiiteipacht, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Myres McDougal cited in KAHNG,
yapvd note 13, at 3.
i"M at 8.
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As far as the general definition of legal disputes is concerned, any dispute which
falls in one or more of these four classes of disputes is by definition "legal."
"But the term "legal" is not confined to these connotations. As pointed out by
Lauterpacht, "legal" encompasses the following:
Does it refer to disputes which are capable of a solution by the apj>lication
of an existing rule of international law? Or to disputes of minor impor-
tance as distinguished from political disputes involving grave issues? Or
to disputes to which the plaintiff state puts forward its demand in the
form of a legal proposition? Or does it refer to disputes in which the
application of legal rules is likely to yield results compatible with justice
and the progress of international relations? The term "legal" has been
applied in the last thirty years in each of these meanings." ^^
It has to be noted that a dispute is clearly not legal though it may be "about"
international law, if it is not centered upon the legal "position" (which is not con-
tested by the parties) but upon whether or not that position should be altered or
disregarded. ^^ "Although interpretation of a treaty is prima facie a function within
the competence of an international tribunal, the terms of the particular treaty may
raise matters regarding political rather than legal judgments". ^^
The International Court of Justice, in handling the issue of its power to adjudicate
an international dispute, applied a similar principle and pronounced that if a question
is referred to the Court which cannot be resolved by applying legal criteria, then
unless it has been asked to give a decision ex aequo et bono, the Court must declare
its incompetence. ^^
At the same time, there is a fundamental diflFerence between answering a ques-
tion which is essentially political, and answering a legal question in the light of
political factors. ^^ It was pointed out by the International Court of Justice in
^'"British Reservations to the Optional Clause," 10 Economica 162 (1930).
^^GREIC, t<upra note 10, at 476.
^"WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM 172 (1987).
^^GREIG, supra note 10, at 477.

its early advisory opinions concerning the interpretation of the Charter that wliat-
ever the background or political implications of a case be, if it raises a question of
international law, the Court can give a decision. ^^
It therefore follows that irrespective of the interplay of law and politics, the
viiiderlying issue involved in an international dispute is either a question of law or
fact, requiring resolution by application of legal principles or by political means as
the case may be.
Exemplifying this principle. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in
the Mavrommatis case provided that, "a dispute is a disagreement on a point of
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons. ^^ The
disputes handled by the Security Council are no exception to this and are centered
upon either a legal or political question.
3.3 U.N. Charter interpretation
According to Article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council, in recom-
mending appropriate procedures or methods of peaceful settlement of international
disi)utes brought to its attention, "should also take into consideration that legal
disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to International Court
of .lustice." Throughout the history of the Security Council only rarely have these
formal procedures of handling legal cjuestions been followed. ^'* This evidences that
the Security Council has dealt on its own both political as well as legal questions.
It has been argued that the United Nations is a "living" institution and that
the Charter is more like a constitution than an ordinary treaty. '^^ The Charter
'^^C'ompetence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1950 I.C..J. Rep. 3 at 13.
"P.C.I..J. (sei. A) No. 2, at 11.
'^''KAHNG, nuimi note 13, at .5.
'^••CHARTER AND LIVING LAW 160.
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vvliicli sets iortli the objectives, purposes, principles of the Organization, and the
powers and functions of the organs, has made obhgatory for the Security Council to
"bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace." ^'^ Further, the Preamble of the ("barter
says: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained."
The Security C'ouncil is therefore under a constraint to give primary consideration
1 (J t lie priiicii)les of international law when confronted with a legal question. However,
the U.N. ("barter and the general international law include principles of justice as well
as rules of order, ^' and the rules concerning recognition, aggression, disarmament,
and military necessity are therefore the primary concern of the international order. ^^
These principles are also known as principles of new international law. Characterized
in the Charter are also the basic principles of law or the customary international
law. '''
Thus in majority of the cases where interpretation of international law is recjuired,
the interpretation of the ('barter would suffice, because the Charter itself is an
eml)odiment of the principles of international law, and as pointed out by Quincy
Wright, law emerges from the interpretation and application of those principles
contained in the Charter. '^"
^'^Tliis ol)hgatiou, described in U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, is imposed upon all the
organs of the organization.
^"QUINCY WRIGHT, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION
OF WAR 15 (1961).
^'^See supra p. 5.
^^See supra p.5 and text accompanying notes 10-14.
3«QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 19
(1960).
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There is a division of opinion amongst the scholars of international law as to the
nature of the United Nations Charter. It has been viewed either as a multilateral
treaty or as a constitution. Whether it is called a constitution, a constituent instru-
ment or a special treaty, it has been argued that the following features of the Charter
have set it apart not only from bilateral treaties, but from other multilateral treaties
as well: In the hrst place, it is a constituent instrument defining the structure of
the Organization and setting forth the powers and functions of its organs and the
rights and duties of its members. Second, it was intended to endure not just for the
present, or for the foreseeable future, but for "succeeding generations." Third it is
sui)erior to all other treaties as a "higher law" (Art 103 and 2(6)). And fourth, the
states that participated in its drafting are far out numbered by new members. ^^
It has been remarked by Samuel Sliih and Tsaichen, that "The problem of con-
stitutional interijretation is two- fold: (1) Who has the authority to interpret? and
(2) How to interpret? '^'^
Though interpretation has been the principal method by which the Charter has
been adapted to new conditions, answers to these basic questions are not specifically
provided for in the Charter itself. '^^
Answer to the first question, "who has the authority to interpret?" is kept open
l)y the San Francisco Conference, leaving each organ of the United Nations to inter-
[)ret itself the relevant parts of the Charter with the hope that their interpretation
will receive general support and make the United Nations a living institution. '^'^ It
is commonly perceived that the Charter leaves the door wide open for any organ,
or even the members individually to interpret it. Since the Charter is not a model
^^ Blaine Sloan, The Unittd Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 Pace Y.B. Int'l L. 61,
ll(i-li7 (1989).
"SAMUEL SHIH & TSAICHEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION 78 (1973).
"LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UN IN A CHANGING WORLD (1974).
^''SHIH fc TSAICHEN, supra note 32.
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ut precise (liatting, the pioiuse ambiguities and even inconsistencies make possible
\vi(l<' divergencies of interpretation and development. '^^
Concerning the precept of interpretation, it has been pointed out that the spe-
cial features of the ('barter preeminently warrant the application of the points
relating both to treat.y interpretation and to constitutional construction: evolu-
tionary development, subsec|uent practice, structural interpretation and effective-
ness. ^*' Professor Oscar Schachter, as early as 1951, applied the theory of evo-
lutionary development, and stated: "it [the Charter] is a constitutional instrument
whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing circumstances for an undefined
future. Any doubt as to the flexibility and adaptability of the Charter must surely
have been resolved by recent developments." '^' Interpretation of the principles of
domestic jurisdiction, self-defense, etc., are glorious examples illustrating that the
II. N. Charter has proved itself sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations.
Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on treaties states the approach to interpre-
tation, "in the light of its object and purpose." "^^ Such an interpretation is perfectly
applicable to the Charter because the broad and sweeping language of the Preamble
and of Article 1 on the purposes of the United Nations manifests nothing but the
object and purpose. In the words of Quincy Wright, "Even if some of the opera-
tional clauses appear precise in their terms, the symbolic preamble and the broad
assertions of purposes and principles provide ample opportunity for supplementing,
complementing or modifying their apparent meaning." "^^
The structural interpretation remains in the background waiting to play its role
in the proper time and circumstances, although the International Court, in inter-
^'"WRIGHT, supia note 30, at 33.
^'' Sloan, supra note 31, at 117.
^'Book Review. GO Yale L.J. 189, 193 (1951), reviewing H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS (1966).
'^^Scf Haldeninian, Lc(jal Basis fo?- United Nations Forces, 56 A.J.I.L. 971 (1962).
^"^WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 33.
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pretirig the Charter, has referred to "the structure of the Charter" and "the relations
estahHshed by it between the General Assembly and the Security Council." ''"
The "principle of effectiveness" would give priority to achieving the major pur-
poses of the Organization and subordinating restrictive provisions of the Charter. '^^
Lit)Pral or effective interpretation', which gives weight to the purposes of the orga-
nization, and which permits any organ to act when necessary and proper to carry
out the purposes of the charter unless explicitly forbidden or unless the proposed
action is clearly contrary to the general intentions of the instrument. '^^
In support of the theory of 'liberal interpretation', the International Court of
Justice, in the Certain Expenses case, expressed the view that, [W]hen the orga-
nization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the
fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is
that such action is not "ultra vires" the Organization. '^^
Another category known as 'restrictive interpretation' has also been recognized,
which assumes that states have not parted with their sovereignty or limited its
exercise unless they have agreed to do so expressly and explicitly. Those who espouse
the- princijjle of 'restrictive interpretation' are more inclined to view the Charter as
a treaty to be interpreted with the recognized i)rinciples of treaty interpretation. '^'^
Interpretation tlnougli practice, which is a ])rocedure allowing flexibility and
organic growth (Article 31(3)(b) of Vienna Convention) is particularly appropriate
for documents like the Charter, whether we call it a constitution, a constituent
'^".S'ee Sloan, supra note 31.
"^^ Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, S>^ Am. .J. Int'l L. 1 (1994).
'^HVRIGHT, supra note 30, at 38. See GOODRICH, supra note 33, at 36.
^^Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. 157. Also, in its opinion on the capacity of the
United Nations to luring a claim for damages suffered by an official of the Organization, it
stated that, "[T]he organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary imphcation as being
essential to the performance of its duties." See GOODRICH, supra note 33, at 37.
^'^GOODRICH, Supra note 33, at 36.
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iiistniiiieut or a spefial treaty sui generis. ''^ For example, Article 22 of the U.N.
Charter autliorizing the General Assembly to establish such sul)si(liary organs as
it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Instead of interi)reting it
narrowly to refer only to committees and commissions set up to assist the Assembly
through studies and advice, it has been broadly interpreted to permit the estab-
lishment of a great variety of operational agencies including peace keeping forces,
aid missions, an environmental agency and other organs needed to meet particular
exigencies. ''^' An often cited example is. Article 27(3) requires the affirmative
\'()te interpreted expansively of nine members including "the concurring votes of
the permanent members" for decisions on all matters other than procedure. Prac-
tice quickly established that abstentions would not be considered vetoes. '^^ Peace
Keeping operations, developed by the General Assembly and subsequently followed
by the Security Council is another example. '^^ Peace keeping falls somewhere
between peaceful settlement m Chapter VI and Enforcement Action in Chapter VII,
l)ut finds no precise authorization in the Charter. '''^ These firmly established prac-
tices are variously considered either a broad interpretation or informal amendment
through practice.
Although the common values which the Charter sets forth are stated in very
general terms and their generality permits much latitude in their interpretation,
the organs oi the United Natjons, generally speaking, do not have the authority to
interpret and apply these jninciples in any conclusive manner. ^°
Since the responsibility for interpretation is vested in organs and members alike,
the process is more likely to be political than judicial. The task faced by most
'*' Sloan, supra note 31, at 120.
^' Id. at 120-121.
'^^Id. at 121.
^''Id.
^"GOODRICH, supra note 33, at 29.
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U.N. bodies is j)iart.ica.l and iustrumerital-that is, to prepare a plan of action or to
reroinnuMid state l)eliavioi to achieve a goal. ^^ A political body, in majority of the
cases, takes the action deemed expedient in the circumstances, thereby indicating
that it regards its action as in accord with the Charter, ^^ and, interpretation is
iiiil>licit in the measures adopted, which are centered largely on the relation between
means and ends in the specific contexts. ^^
There are important exceptions, however, where interpretation of a more exphcit
adjudicative character related mainly to the U.N. Charter provisions and to some
major treaties is involved. ^'^ The vagueness and ambiguity of the Charter provisions
lead to multiple contradicting perceptions thereby making the process of interpre-
tation complex and debatable. This is especially true regarding the obligations of
states under the Charter and general international law in regard to the use of force,
intervention, self-determination, human rights, and the principles of sovereignty,
independence, threats to the peace, and equality. ^^
It is constructive, with respect to the issues of this thesis to analyze how few of
the important provisions of international law enumerated in the Charter which were
severely contested were interpreted by the Security Council during the years of its
practice.
'^Schachter, supra note 4i, at 6.
"WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 37.
''^Schachter, supra note 41, a.t 6.
'-'Id. at 7.

Chapter 4
The Security Council's approach to the interpretation of Charter
LAW
4.1 Article 2(4) of the Charter
Article 2(4) states that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations."
Article 2(4) is one of the few provisions of the Charter that stands significant
and distinct from the others, and that has a greater impact on the political and legal
aspects of the behavior of states. It implicitly reiterates the objective of the United
Nations- 'maintenance of peace and security,' by imposing a negative obligation on
the member states, which is to refrain from threat or use of force. It Focuses on an
important concept of international law-the threat or use of force, and accordingly
sets lorth the duties of the members.
A i)roper interpretation of Article 2(4) would necessitate a careful reading of
Article 39. Article 2(4) and Article 39 go hand in hand, and therefore, ought to be
read simultaneously. Thus in the joint opinion of Anthony D'Amato and Detlev F.
Vagts, " To 'apply' Article 2(4)in isolation from Chapter VII would be to ignore the
other side of the coin. That is not to say that Article 2(4) would be meaningless
22
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111 the absence of Security Council enforcement action; rather, it must be carefully
interpreted''. ^
This is certainly true because, Article 2(4) does not only prohibit the threat or
use of force to achieve political objectives, but also prohibits the use of force in
any other manner inconsistent with the with the purposes of the United Nations.
The determination as to whether any threat or use of force is inconsistent with the
l)urposes of the United Nations (which is primarily to maintain international peace
and security by prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression), is made by the Security Council, as empowered by
.\rticle 39 of the Charter.
(
'areful scrutiny reveals that it does not outlaw all transboundary uses of military
force, but only those directed against a nation's territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence. A '"humanitarian intervention" that does not annex any portion of the
target state arguably is allowed by Article 2(4) if the Security Council's enforcement
capability is prevented by the veto. Thus, since 1945 there have been several suc-
cessful unilateral humanitarian interventions arguably creating new customary law,
such as India in Bangladesh (1971), Tanzania in Uganda (1979), France in Central
Africa (1979), and the United States in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).
According to the text and the drafters' intent. Article 2(4) does not cover internal
use ol lorce, such as civil strife, revolutions, etc., and in a corresponding construction,
the terms "breach of the peace," "act of aggression," and "threat to the peace," as
used ill Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, have been interpreted to relate to the inter-
national use or threat of use of military force. ^ In all but two cases, the Council
^Anthony D'Amato and Detlev F. Vagts, Right v. Might: International law and the
uae of force, 85 Am. .J. Int'l L. 201, 202 (1991).
"^.Jost Dell)ruck, A more effective international law or a new "World Law"'^-Sonie
Aspects of the development of international law in a changing international system, 68
lud. L..T. 705, 708 (1993).
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lias adliered to a narrow reading of both Article 2(4) and Article 39. ^ The fol-
lowing instances, however, in the post-Cold War era, manifests that the Coun( il. in
fnrtheranc e of the object and ])nrposes of the United Nations, laid a strong fonnda-
tion for the emerging i)rinciijles of international law by not merely reinterpreting the
principles of the two Articles, bnt also by taking effective enforcement measures.
The Council's determination that the consequences of the repression of the Kurds
in Iraq by the Iraqi government during the wake of the recent Gulf War, "threaten
international peace and security" substantively corresponds to Article 39, which
empowers the Security Council to determine whether there exists "a threat to or
breach of the peace or an act of aggression." '^ It is evident from the text of the
resolution that the C'ouncil found that an internal situation-the forcible repression
of minorities in Iraci- constituted a threat to international peace and security because
of it ''consequences," that is, its potential escalation into an international conflict. ^
Less than half a year later, the Security Council confronted the growing violence
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where the constituent republics of Slovenia and
Croatia set out to secede from the Federation. *^ Although there was no immediate
danger of neighboring states becoming involved in the military conflict, the Security
Council did not hesitate in classifying the situation as a "threat to international
peace and security."
Also, when reports of massive air raids on the Shiite minority in southern Iraq
were received in early fall 1992, although by inference rather than express decision
taken, the violence within Iraq was the starting point for an interventionist activity
within the framework of a Security Council decision. ^
^M a,t 70S.
"^Id. at 708-709.
\S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1991).
''Delbruck, supra note 2, at 709.
'Id. at 710.
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Subsequently, in the cases of Somalia and Haiti, the Security Council character-
ized the internal conflict as a threat to international peace and took Chapter \'I1
enforcement measures. '^ These instances indicate that the Council is prepared to
construe Article 39 more broadly than it was originally envisaged and applied. The
enforcement of the i)rohibition of the use of force, that is, of Article 2(4), seems also
to extend now to internal as well as international use of force, where this internal
use of force at least potentially, or with some reasonable probability, constitutes a
threat to international peace and security and/or results in massive human rights
violations.
The Charter recognizes three major exceptions to the use of armed force within
the meaning of Article 2(4): '* The first is provided by Article 51, which preserves for
states "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," thereby permitting
the states to exercise this right "until the security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." The second exception to
Article 2(4) arises once the Security C'ouncil takes the "necessary measures." Hence,
once the Security Council takes the "necessary measures" which transform an action
of sell-defense into an enforcement action, member states have a duty to assist in the
enforcement action and to refrain from assisting the aggressor (Art 2(5)). The mech-
anism for facilitating this transformation is contained in the enforcement provisions
of Chapter VH. But this mechanism is dependent on the special agreements being
concluded between the member states and the United Nations. Until this happens,
a transitional security arrangement under Article 106 operates. This agreement pro-
vides the third major exception to Article 2(4): a joint action by the five permanent
members of the Security Covmcil on behalf of the United Nations.
*" See infra notes 32 and 3G.
'''The three exceptions are discussed in Derek Gilnian, The Gulf War and the United
Nations Charter: Did the Security Council fulfill its original mission, 24 Conn. L. Rev.
1131, 1135 (1992).
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A few more exceptions could be identified by a careful scrutiny of Article 2(4).
As has been interpreted by one school of thought, it is a conditional qualified ban
on the use of force, because, the closing words of Article 2(4), prohibiting the use of
force in any aspect contrary to the purposes of the United Nations Charter, when
read in conjunction with the lunnan rights provisions throughout the Charter (Arts
1(3), 13(1 )(b), 55(c), 02(2) ()8(2)), lend further credence to this proposition-they are
regarded as supporting a contextual reading of the proscription of the use of force,
balancing the latter against the protection of human rights. ^"
Thus, force used for i)ur})oses consistent with the spirit of the United Nations,
such as intervention to uphold human rights, is arguably allowed by Article 2(4),
and since 1945 there have been several successful unilateral humanitarian interven-
tions arguably creating new customary law, such as India in Bangladesh (1971),
Tanzania in Uganda (1979), France in Central Africa (1979), and the United States
in Grena.da(1983) and Panama (1989). ^^
4.2 Article 2(7) of the Charter
Non-intervention is a fundamental principle of International law based upon the
Sovereignty, equality, and the political independence of states. ^^ This obligation
extends to both states and international organizations. The founders of the United
Nations incorporated the doctrine of non-intervention in Art 2(7) of the U.N. Charter
which reads:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
^"^.Tudy A. Gallant, HunianituTian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A
reappraisal in light of a chantjincj world order, 7 Am. U. J. Int'l k. Pol'y 881, 888 (1992).
^^ See supra p. 12 and note 11.
^'^Rutli Gordon, United Nations Intervention in internal conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
Bexjond, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 519, 520 (1994).
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matters to settleiiiciit under the j:)resent Charter; but this principle sliall
not prejudice the apphcation of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII."
This ])rovision has also been extensively criticized as vague and ambiguous, and
therefore susceptible to multiple interpretations.
A ''broad" interpretation of the provision has led to contentions that, ^'^ (1) it
was incorporated in the Charter in Article 2 as one of the Principles; Consequently,
it is a rule rather than an exception in the operation of the United Nations. (2) the
exclusion of the reference to ''international law" at San Francisco Conference implied
the competence of a nation to determine whether a matter was within the domestic
jurisdiction of that State. (3) the term "intervene" is a broad term the meaning of
which includes all measures of intervention, dictatorial or otherwise. (4) the use of
the term "essentially" in place of "solely" increased the reserved domain, for some
matters which are not solely within the domestic jurisdiction "such as the questions
of nationality would still be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"; and (5) the
insertion of words "enforcement measures" further prevented the Organization from
intervening in domestic matters even under Chapter VII of the Charter, if proposed
action were in the nature of provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter.
However, a "narrow" interpretation of the paragraph has provided that, ^"^ (1)
"discussion" of a question does not constitute an intervention; the same is true of
recommendations of general character and even those specifically addressed to indi-
vidual states if they are not calculated to exercise direct pressure; (2) the principle
of dcjmestic jurisdiction should be balanced by other equally important principles of
the C'harter; (3) there is no substantial legal, much less practical, difference between
i^SVc TAE .UN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 28-29
1904).
^•^Id. at 29.
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the terms "essentially" and "solely"; (4) the absence of a provision for the determi-
nation of whether a matter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state
does not warrant auto interpretation by that state; and (5) the cjuestion may be
answered by an impartial finding of the competent non-judicial organs of the United
Nations.
Because of these many ambiguities, caution must be exercised b}' the Security
(louncil in interpreting Article 2(7), so that a reasonable balance may be ensured
between the interest of the Security Council in the maintenance of international
peace and security and the interest of sovereign nations in the exclusive control over
matters falling within their domestic jurisdiction. ^^
Article 2(7), which proclaims the principle of non-intervention, provides in itself
an exception to it: "but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII". In order for the U.N. to adopt enforcement
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council must find that
the controversy: (1) does not lie "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the
state, and (2) constitutes a threat to international peace and security, ^*' and the
power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression vests with the Security Council. ^'
While the phrase "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" is undefined by
the Charter, when new developments in a state become a matter of international
concern, they loses their status as a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state.
^^Id. at 31.
^'^David M. Kresock, ''Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The legal foundations offoreign
intervention, 27 Coniell Int'l L.J. 203, 209-210 (1994).
^" U.N. Charter art. 39, ch. VII.
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Thus, Article 2(7) is inapplicable not only when the Security Council takes mea-
sures pursuant to C!hapter VII of the Charter, but also when a matter is not essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.
As early as 1946, Dr. Evatt, Chairman of the Sub-Committee established by
the Security Council "to make further studies in order to determine whether the
situation in Spain has led to international friction and does endanger international
peace and security, and if it so finds, then to determine what practical measures
the United Nations may take," explained this point in terms of the relation between
Article 2(7) and Chapter VII of the Charter as follows:
"...it should be pointed out quite clearly that Article 2, Paragraph 7, of
the Charter does not say that the United Nations shall not intervene in
any matter which does not fall within Chapter VI. What it does say is
that the United Nations shall not intervene in a matter essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of state. When considering this point we can
forget about Chapter VII. We should concern ourselves only with the
terms of Article 2, Paragraph 7, and ask ourselves whether or not this
question is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Spain. That is
a cpiestion of fact. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case. What are the facts? The facts are that there is a situation the
continuance of which, in the finding of the Sub- Committee, is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." ^*
The Security Council has frequently recognized that domestic disputes often
carry international implications, ^'* and in many cases ripen into a potential threat
of international peace and security. ^°
What constitutes a "threat to the peace" is undefined by the Charter. ^^ Instead,
the Security Council is vested with broad discretionary power in determining a threat
to the peace. ^^ Nevertheless, lack of precision and clarity of the term "threat to
^'^KAHNG, supra note 13, at 34.
^'*Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The lajality of U.N. forcible humanitarian intervention, 17
Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 138, 154 (1994).
^^Appropriate examples are the recent cases of Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somaha, and Haiti.
^^ Gordon, supra note 12, at 563
'^m.N. Charter art. 39, ch. VII.
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the i)efi(-e" has created iiiaiiy problems of interpretation. However, in deteniiiuing
fi threat to the peace, the Security Council has acted vvitli due regard to factual
hu(Hugs, interpretations of Charter provision, and the weighing of political consid-
erations; the concept employed are not solely legal in nature. ^^ Its recent actions in
Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have introduced a new concept of a selective,
collective approach to global security, and a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty
and have also launched collective security missions. ^'^ Each case is discussed in detail
in order to gain a good grasp of the reasoning behind the Security Council's actions.
After the end of Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds began a rebellion against the Baghdad
government, wanting the anti-Iraq coalition to liberate them, along with Kuwait,
from Sadda.m Hussein's Government. ^^ The fierce military onslaught by govern-
ment forces prompted large numbers of Kurds to attempt to flee Iraq for Turkey and
Iran. ^^' Despite tlie massive liuman rights violation, the Security Council remained
inactive for some time because of the prohibition by Article 2(7) of the Charter of
direct intervention in the domestic affairs of the member states, and apparently, the
human rights abuses were not enough to make this an international issue warranting
intervention. ^' Rather it was the massive movement of people to neighboring coun-
tries tliat took the matter out of Iraq's internal affairs and made the Security Council
action by passing of Resolution 688, wherein the Security Council found for the first
time, that massive displacement of refugees constituted a threat to international
"^'^Gordon, supra note 12, at 5()3-564.
'''' Captain Gregory P. Harjjer, Creating a U.N. peace enforcement force: A case for US
kndr.r.slnp, i8-SPG Fletcher F. World Aff. 49, 50 (1994).
"'Mary EUen O'ConixeU, Continuincj limits on U.N. intervention in civil war, 67 Ind.
L..T. 903, 904 (1992).
''''Gordon, supra note 12, at 546-547.
^' Id. Sec Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds' right to secede mider international law: Self-
d( t( rm/.natron prevails over political manipulation, 22 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 375, 405
(1994).
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peace and security. ^^ The ultimate passage of Resolution 688 which involved the
Security ('ouncil in a civil conflict without the consent of the state involved, in the
al)sence of (Jhapter VII measures, is a new and important development. ^'^
The ftghting that broke out in Yugoslavia between the province of Croatia, which
had declared its independence, and the Yugoslav federal government also raised the
(luestion of U.N. intervention in civil war. ^° Although there was no cross-border
activity in this case, the Security Council disregarded the domestic jurisdiction prin-
ciple and declared that the communist problem is so associated with neighboring
states that the threat to the peace is international, and justified the intervention
and application of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The U.N. took a substantial step forward in late 1992 when the Security Council
authorized humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the Security Council, for the
first time, equated massive human tragedy with a threat to international peace. '^^
The horrific situation in Somalia, characterized by anarchy and massive human rights
al)uses in that the population was denied access to food, medicine, and other relief
supplies, undoubtedly made the situation of international concern. ^^ Although the
human rights violations did not pose a viable threat to international peace under
traditional views, the suffering was severe and massive. '^'^ In this factual situation,
the U.N. Charter neither precluded nor mandated humanitarian intervention. '^'^
^^Boutiii, 6?//m/,note 19. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/47
(1991), which states that, "The Security Coinicil .... 1. Condemns the repression of
the Ira.qi civihan population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish
populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in
the region . . . ."
^''^Gordon, supra uote 12, at 549.
^"OX-onneU, supra uote 25, at 909.
^^ Boutin, supra note 19, at 155.
^^Gordon, supia note 12, at 551.
'^'^ Boutin, supra note 19, at 163.
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The Security Council balanced the desperate need lor humanitarian intervention
with political concerns. ^^
Haiti is another instance where the Security Council took a startling step by
intervening in the internal conflict of Haiti, in the rationale of "threat" to the peace,
despite the fact that the Haitian regime was no threat to its neighbors, no military or
any other kind of intervention was contemplated, and that the human rights abuses
were not as serious as those in Somalia. ^"^
While its intervention in Iraq and Yugoslavia are justified by the provisions of
the (Charter, its efforts to deal with the problems in Somalia and Haiti raise profound
(juestions regarding the parameters of the term, "threat to the peace," making later
actions by the Security Council more problematic. '^'
These instances clearly depict that, even an essentially domestic conflict, such as
civil strife, may threaten the stability of the international community and constitute
a threat to the peace. "^'^
4.3 Article 39
The crux of the enforcement mechanism in the U.N. system exists in Article 39 of the
(
'barter, because it makes the very existence or non-existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression dependent upon the determination
made by the Security Council in this regard. It provides that:
"The Security Council Shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make rec-
ommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
'''Id.
^'Kiordon, supra note 12, at 573.
^^M at 546.
'^'^ Gallant, supra note 10, at 906.
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The terms 'iJireat to the peace,' 'breach of the peace,' and 'act of aggression' have
not l)»-eii defined by tiic ( 'barter. This gives the Security Council a wide discretionary
|)ower in determining what constitutes a 'threat to the peace,' a 'breach of the peace,'
or an 'act of aggression.' Even though from the point of view of the context of Article
39, a 'breach of the peace' exists whenever hostihties occur between armed forces
controlled by governments, de facto or de jure, at opposite sides of an internationally
recognized frontier, and a 'threat to the peace occurs when, because of a declaration
of war, of intervention, or of other hostile intent by the government of a state against
another state. '^'^ the Security Council, acting with due regard to factual findings,
inter])reta.tions of Charter provision, and the weighing of political considerations, "*"
has gone far beyond this to accommodate various acts within the undefined terms
including those that have not been envisioned by the Charter. For example, in the
rases concerning Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti, the magnitude of civil strife
within the state was considered an immediate danger of a breach of international
peace.
During the period of Culf War, Iraq deliberately pumped oil into the Gvdf and
ignited oil well fires. Irac^'s deliberate pumping of oil into the Gulf certainly amounts
to a release of a harmful substance from a land-based source, and also constitutes
pollution from an installation operating in the marine environment. '^^
Although the Security Council did not specifically declare that the environmental
damage constituted a "breach of the peace," from a practical perspective, however,
the Seciuity Council had already characterized Iraq's invasion as a "breach of the
peace" and hence there was no need to further characterize individual acts in such
^'-^QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 93-95
(i9()0).
'*".SVr supra pp. 31-33.
''^Autliony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental damage: New Challenges for
internatronal law, 23 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 67, 130 (1992).
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terms. "^^ The Security ('ouiicil l)y its Resolution 687 imposed liability for an
unUiwltil use of force, acknowledging expressly that the unlawful use of force included
environmental damage. '*'*
The hnding that the deliberate sabotage b}^ Iraq constituted 'use of force,' is
one other instance that exemplifies the Security Council's adoption of elaborate
interpretation.
4.4 Article 51 of the Charter
The inadequate statutory drafting of Article 51 has predictably led to substantial
disagreement, '*'* as to the meanings of the words and phrases in the Article.
Article 51 not only revolves around the principle of the legitimate use of force
through self defense, but also couples the rights of states with the function of the
Security Council. In view of the language of this Article, clarity of interpretation
of especially this Article is crucial. Otherwise, whoever interprets Article 51 will
inter]uet to their advantage, and chaos will result. "Because the Charter is the
essential paradigm for determining the legality of actions taken by international
actors, its lack of precision and multiple interpretations cannot be tolerated." ^^
The text of Article 51 provides:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security measures
-i'^ Paragraph Hi of the S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R.es/687
(1991), expressly "re-affirms that Iraq ... is hable under INTERNATIONAL LAW
lor any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and depletion of natural
resources ... as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
'^'^Wallace F. Warriner, The unilateral use of coercion under International law: A legal
anahjf^is o/ the United States raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 Naval L. Rev. 49, 52
(1988).
''•''Tlioma.s K. Plofchan, Article 51: Limits on self-defense, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 336, 344
(1992).
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taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
The Charter recognizes Article 51 as an exception to Article 2(4), whereby, the
states are authorized to exercise their inherent right of individual or collective self
defense. But such a riglit is not unlimited. It was the intent of the drafters of the
Charter that the self-defensive action be permitted only "before the machinery of
the Organization [could] be brought into action," and this intent to permit a very
limited riglit of self-defense is evident in (1) the overall purpose of the Charter, (2)
the purpose of Article 51, and (3) the evolution of the text of the article at the San
Francisco Conference. '^^
The text of Article 51 dictates that the right of self-defense is limited and cannot
be exercised after the Security Council takes the "measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." The phrase "until the Securit}' Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" is very vague and
is open to numerous interpretations. '*'
Since the Charter does not explicitly define "measures necessary," it is not clear at
what point Article 51 limits a nation's right of self-defense. If "measures necessary"
is interpreted expansively to include even the call for a Security Council meeting to
discuss a conflict, then a nation's right of self-defense would be cut off quickly. '^^
At the other extreme, if "measures necessary" is read to mean only Security Council
actions which actually end a conflict, then a nation would have a virtually unlimited
right to take independent action at any time during a conflict. '^^
'^^'Kathryn S. Elliott, The New world order and the right of self-defense in the united
luitrons charter, 15 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 55, 69 (1991).
^' Plofchaii, supra note 45, at 339-340.
'^^Elhott, supra note 4(i, at 68.
^''Id.
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Thus, based on the interpretation that self-defense action is allowed until the
Security Council takes action, if Article 51 was applied to the situation of Iraq's
armed attack against Kuwait during 1990, then, when the Council already has taken
such measures- namely economic sanctions against Iraq and the dispatch of naval
forces to regional waters to enforce against Iracj, Kuwait's right to resist no longer
existed, because the Security Council passed several resolutions on this crisis, and
an action was therefore taken. ^'^
Another plausible interpretation is that self-defensive action is permitted until
the Security Council takes action that definitely restores and maintains international
peace and security. Since the economic sanctions showed no signs of forcing Ira<i
out of Kuwait, continued self-defensive action by Kuwait and its allies is permitted
despite the Security C-ouncil's adoption of economic sanctions. ^^
Article 39 indicates that "measures necessary" means whatever measures the
Security Council selects, and also empowers the Security Council to "decide what
measures shall betaken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace. Further, Article 39 is the first Article in Chapter VII of the
Charter, which includes Article 41 (allowing economic sanctions, embargo, and sev-
erance of diplomatic relations), Article 42 (allowing collective police action) and
Article 51. "
According to the Charter, therefore, it is within the province of the Security
C-ouncil to determine what types of measures are necessary to restore international
peace and security. These measures may be listed in Articles 41 and 42, such as
economic sanctions, embargo, severance of diplomatic relations, or collective police
action. Thus, if the Security Council passes a resolution calling for an embargo, the
'"'^'Plofcha.u, supra note 45, at 341.
^^1(1. at 342-343.
^"^EUiott, supra note 46, at 68.
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Council lias cxj)i("sse(l its deterniiiiatioii of the measure necessary lor the restoration
of international peace. ^"^
As far as Article 51 is concerned, various scholars have given their opinion and
following are a few of tlieni. First, as Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School
suggests, a nation could exercise the right of self-defense when the Security Council
is debating a situation "with no likelihood of a serious substantive outcome.'" As an
exanii)le, he states that when the Security Council was immobilized by reciprocal
vetoes during the Cold War, "a state acting in individual or collective self-defense
could not be expected to forego continuing action simply because the Council was
debating the situation" with no prospect for passage of a resolution. ^^ Similarly,
Professor Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel of New York University School of Law
argue that the right of self-defense, suspended by a collective police action, might
revive if the Council became blocked from taking necessary measures. ^^ Second,
Professor Chayes proposes that a nation's right of self-defense might not be limited
when the Security Council's action is "plainly in commensurate with the seriousness
of the situation." ^'^ Rarely has a nation acted independently based on the Security
Council's failure to take the measures necessary. ^^
The correct meaning of the two phrases, "inherent right" and "if an armed attack
occurs," is also open to debate. ^^ Professor Kelsen writes that: [T]he (Jharter
restricts the right of that the right applies only against "an armed attack" .... It
is of important to note that Article 51 does not use the term "aggression" but the
much narrower concept of "armed attack," which means that a merely "imminent"
''''Al)raui Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persicm Gulf, Address at the U.S. -Soviet
(onfereiice on the Non-Use of Force, at 9 (Oct. 4, 5, and 6, 1990).
"Thomas Franck & Fazia Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
Relations Law, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 3 (1990).
'''Elliott, supra note 46, at 69.
^''Id.
''^WarriiLer, supra note 44, at 52.
i
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attack or any act of aggression which [does] not [have] the character oi an attaclv
involving the use of armed force does not justify resort to force as an exercise of
the right established by Article 51. ^^ Scholars have construed this language as a
limitation or restriction on the traditional right of self-defense.
Based ui)on the examination of the founding documents pertaining to Article
.")!, and from the examination of the founding documents relevant to Chapter VIII
of the U.N. (/barter on regional arrangements, it has been argued that the right of
self-defense should exist at all times unless the Security Council were to specifically
prohibit its exercise. ''"
It could therefore be concluded that the right of self-defense is fundamental and
can only be limited if state action is in direct contravention of the purposes and
principles of the Charter, or if the Security Council takes explicit action to limit this
right. '''
4.5 Article 106 of the Charter
Article 106 states that, prior to the conclusion of the special agreements, in order for
the Security Council to exercise its responsibilities under Article 42: "The parties to
the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall
in accordance with the i)rovisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with
one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations
with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The four states
referred to in the Article are the permanent members of the Security Council.
'"'^Haiis Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 A.J.I.L. 401-402
1943).
''"Plofchau, supra note 45, at 372.
'^^Id. at 373.
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The wording is uiicleai a.l)Out whether the duty to consult "with a view to such
joint action" inckides a duty to actually take action, and also as to whether tlie
sul^ject of the consultation even has to include the measures decided upon by the
Security Council. ^^
According to Professor Hans Kelsen, Article 106 is susceptible to two interpreta-
tions: either (i) the Five Powers can take joint action only after the Security Council
has made a determination under Article 39; or (ii) the Five Powers are completely
independent of the Security Council and may take joint action when they see as
necessary to maintain international peace and security. ^^ He sees the first view,
that joint action can only be taken after the Security Council makes a determination
under Article 39 as more compelling. ^'^
In the Gulf Wa.r situation, the Security Council, by determining there w-as a
breach of international peace and security, obligated itself to decide what measures
not involving the use of force needed to be taken under Article 41, and impliedly
authorized the Five Powers to consult with each other (and if the occasion required
with other member states) with a view to taking joint action. *^^ Simultaneously,
acting under Article 42, the Security Council sought a voluntary resolution of the
crisis Ijy calling upon Iraq to comply with a provisional measure: the withdrawal of
its forces from Kuwait. *'*'
Further, the exact nature of the relationship between Article 106 and C^hapter
MI is unclear. *" Article 106 authorizes "joint action" by the Five powers, yet this
''^Gihnan, supra note 9, at 1139.
"^HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 760 (1950) .
*'''A/. Sc(: Timothy Mcllniail, No-Fly Zones: The imposition and enforcement of air
exclusion re(jimes over Bosnia and Iraq, 11 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 35 (1994).
''^''Gihna.u, supra note 9, at 1146.
'••\S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1991).
(>7
"Gihuan, supra note 9, at 1143.
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term is undefiiKMl. It is clcai t hat "action" refers to military action, but, what is less
clem is wluit ([ualifies siuli action as "joint." ^
Since Article 106 does not expressly require unanimity of purpose, a more flexible
interpretation of Article lOG permits action without strict unanimity of purpose
among i^ernianent Members, thereby making it a viable solution to Security Council
paralysis. "'-*
Until now, however, the Security Council members have never voted to adopt res-
olutions while acknowledging that any threat determination authorizes independent
joint-enforcement action by Permanent Members. ^^
4.6 Question as to the functional competence (Article 24(1) or the
Charter)
Question as to functional competence, meaning 'implied competence' mostly con-
cerns the interpretation of Art. 24. All the questions of competence involved, for
obvious reasons, the problem of the interpretation of the Charter. '^
On the i)oint of 'the capacity of an international organization to expand and the
limits set to its freedom are both determined by its functions,' the ICJ declared;
"[T]he rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must
depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its
constituent documents and developed in practice. '^ Under interna-
tional law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties
" 73
'''''Tiniothy Mclhuail, No-fly zones: The imposition and enforcement of air exclusion
rejlimvs over Bosnia and Iraq, 11 Loy. L.A. Int'l &: Conip. L.J. 35, 62 (1994).
'^KAHNG, supra note 13, at 93.
''' Reparations Case, 1949 I.C..T. ISO.
'•^r/. at 182.
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As of December 1946, there arose a question whether the Security Couiu il was
enij^owerecl under the Charter to assume responsibihties for the integrity and iiidc-
pcndenre of the Free Territory of Trieste. ^'^ At the 9ist meeting of the Couik il ow
10 .laniiary 1947, a second meeting on the case, the Council heard a statement of
the Secretary- General in which he presented the following interpretation of Article
24 of the Charter:
The words "jirimary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security," coupled with the phrase, "acts on their
behalf," constitute a grant of power sufficiently wide to enable the Secu-
rity Council to approve the documents in question and to assume the
responsibilities arising therefrom.
Furthermore, the records of the fourteenth meeting of the Committee
III/I at San Francisco, demonstrate that the Security Council was not
restricted to the specific powers set forth in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and
XII. In the discussion, all the delegations which spoke, including both
proponents and opponents of this amendment, recognized in this discus-
sion that the responsibility that the responsibility to maintain peace and
security carried with it a power to discharge this responsibility. This
power, it was noted, was not unlimited, but subject to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. ^^
In handling of questions relating to competence, the Council has necessarily
concerned itself with the interpretation of those provisions of the Charter which
related to the functions of the C'ouncil under specific situations and disputes. ''^
Most significant development appears to have been made in the field of the
implied power of the Security Council: Not only the power to determine the nature of
a disj)ute when "legally" there no longer existed a dispute and the power to undertake
territorial administration together with accompanying responsibilities, but also the
power to establish a non-enforcement force, determine its functions irrespective of
the intention of the host state, and authorize it to use force for the purpose of, among
'''KAHNG, sxipia note 13, at 75.
"'S.C.O.R., 91st mtg., pp 44-45.
"''KAHNG, sajmi note 13, at 94.
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others, pieventiiig n civil vvai, may all be regarded to have been established. " The
cninulative effect of this development may be such that the scojje of the iniplicd
])ovver of the Council may still expand in yet unknown direction.
4.7 Overview
There are no specific categories of legal disputes where it may be reasonably antici-
pated that the Security Council would follow a certain pattern of handling them and
giving its legal opinion. '* Whether the legal question be on the revision of treaty,
the construction of customary lavv, or a principle of international law, or the legality
of nationalization, the Council may follow a course of action it considers appropriate
in the context of each case. '^
Although its practice demonstrates that it is undoubtedly politics which played
the greater role in the Security Council and that it is a function of politics, and
not of law, to promote the functional interplay and even integration of the law and
politics, a change towards the better side in its reaction to an international crisis
since the collapse of the east-west power politics cannot be overlooked.
It has followed exclusively the first of the numerous methods of the Charter
interpretation anticipated by the San Francisco Conference, ^^ and its interpretation
of Articles 2(7) and 51 illustrates the same.
"Id. at 108-109.
~^Id. at 226.
''"Id.

Chapter 5
Implementation of International Legal principles
5.1 The Security Council as an enforcement authority
All individual state being its own law enforcement agent, International legal order
has lacked a, general central law enl'orceinent authority to enforce international norms
and ol)ligatioiis in day-to-day international transactions. ^ Modern international
law, as it has evolved particularly after World War II, has centralized international
use of force to the extent that military enforcement measures may be applied only
under the authority of the U.N. Security Council or in cases of individual or collective
self-defense within the bounds of Article 51. ^
A substantial array of tools with which the Security Council could pursue its
l)rimary mission of maintaining international peace and security '^ are contained in
C'hapters VI, and V'll of the Charter, which grants the Security Council immense
powers to perform the enforcement function. The various methods as contained in
Chapter VI include diplomatic action, such as facilitating consultation and negoti-
ation among member nations, '' instituting investigations with binding force, and
such other measures of conflict prevention, and making recommendations by means
ol resolutions with a view to a pacific settlement of disputes.
.Tost Del])nick, A inoTe ejfeciive international law or a new "luorld law"?-Sojne aspects
oj tlu Development of international law in a clianginy international system, 68 Iiid. L..T.
705, 720 (1993).
^Id. a.t 721.
Maury D. Sheiik, The United Nations Security Council Consultation Act: A proposal
for multilateral resolution, of international conflict, 28 Stan. .J. Iiit'l L. 247, 252 (1991).
Ud.
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The Security Council has been involved in numerous disputes as a quasi judirial
body, and has dealt with all kinds of questions, l)oth legal and political. The resolu-
1 ions |)asse(l by the Security C^ouncil for settlement of the disputes reflect the Security
('onnciTs perspective of international law and constitutes the measures taken by the
Security douncil to inii)lenient the International law. The Security C'ouncil also
serves as a forum for informal consultations among its members thereby facilitating
relaxed negotiations and effective conflict resolution. ^
("hapter VII of the U.N. ('barter, which sets forth the Security Council's powers
for responding to the threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-
sion, is intended by the framers of the Charter to be "the teeth of the United
Nations." *' Significant among these include the Security Council's authority to
"determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and to make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security." ' The enforcement measures include, imposition of economic and military
sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, ^ the use of collective armed force, '^ and
non aggressive military action, such as dispatching and maintaining peacekeeping
missions.
5.2 Sanctions
Sanctions assume a punitive nature by representing the "penalty attached to trans-
gression and breach of international law" in the form of "punitive actions initiated
by a number of international actors, particularly a world organization such as the
^Id. at 252-253.
*'/f/. See Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, compliance and international law: Reflec-
tions on the United Nations' erperience against Iraq, 32 Va. J. Iiit'l L. 1 (1991).
'U.N. Charter art. 39, ch. VII.
^U.N. Charter art. 41, ch. VII.
'm.N. Charter art. 42. ch. VII.
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League of Nations or the United Nations, against one or more states for violating
a universally approved Charter, as inducements to follow, or refrain from lollovving,
that particular course of conduct and conform with international law." ^"
One of the most significant objectives of the use of sanctions is to send a clear
signal to the target state (the state against which the penalties are being imposed)
that, its behavior is unacceptable to the international community, constituting a
service of notice that further illegal action or continuation of the present illegal
a.cti(ni may lead to more serious measures. ^^
There are various forms of sanctions, for example, there are moral and dijilo-
matic sanctions, which attempt to effectively isolate the target state in terms of
public opinion or official diplomatic recognition, economic sanctions, that seek to
achieve political goals through the isolation of the target state's economy by using
techniques such as boycotts, embargoes, blockades, asset freezes, financial transac-
tion restrictions, and other economic tactics, maritime sanctions, etc. ^^
In framing the Charter of the United Nations, special attention was again given
to the use of economic sanctions as part of a more sophisticated system of collective
security, and the Security Council has resorted to sanctions as one of its enforcement
action sunder Chapter VII of the Charter during the following occasions: First, in
1*)()(), comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia after a unilateral
declaration of independence from Britain by the government of Ian Smith. The
second instance involved an arms embargo against South Africa, imposed in 1977
and wliich continues to the present day. The most recent instances of sanctions
authorized by the Security C'ouncil pertains to Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti.
^'^Joyiier, bupra note G, at 2-3.
11M at 3.
i^/r/. at 4.
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The uiiipty number of resolutions passed by the Security Council with respect to
sanctions collectively represent the exercise of Security Council authority to restore
iutcrnatioiial peace and stability.
The cases discussed below -nvolve one or more principles of international law,
and their detailed discussion depicts the manner in which the Security Council has
implemented those principles.
5.3 Some instances of Security Council's performance
5.3.1 Congo
Shortly after the former Belgian Congo became independent on June 30, 19G0, the
])rovince of Katanga, under Moise Tshombe, with military and other support of
Belgium seceded from the new Republic and declared itself independent. ^^
While the Security Council did not adopt the view that the Belgian troop's
presence constituted aggression, it agreed with the argument that the troops violated
Congolese sovereignty and made the dispute between the Congolese government and
Katanga an international one. ^'^
Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) called upon Belgium to withdraw its
troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire). ^^ Secu-
rity C'ouncil Resolution 145 (1960), while recognizing that the Congo had been
admitted to U.N. membership "as a unit" ^"^ called on all governments to refrain
from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political
independence of the republic of the Congo. Security Council Resolution 169 (1961)
^•^La.wreiice S. Eastwood, Secession: State practice and international law after the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia^ 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 304-307 (1993).
^'^Michael .1. Ma.ttler, The distinction between civil luars and international wars and its
lecjal implications, 2() N.Y.U.J. Int'l fe Pol. 662 (1994).
^'S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
^'\S.C. Res. 145, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/15 (1960).
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strongly (le])lore(l ''secessionist activities and armed action now being carried (;ii by
the provincial administration of Katanga" and comj)letely rejected "the claim that
Katanga is a 'sovereign and independent nation'." ^' It requested all member states
'"to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and
])ur])Oses of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the
general i)uri)oses of the ('barter."
The case of Katanga highlighted several principles of U.N. policy: Colonial Ixn-
ders are to be maintained sacred and secession from an existing state is taboo; in civil
disturl)ances within the borders if a Member State foreign aid to non-governmental
forces will not be tolerated; and most importantly, recognition as a state should be
denied in cases where '"independence" is grounded upon secession of the territory in
question. ^^
5.3.2 Rhodesia
On Novenil)er 11, 1965, the minority white government of Southern Rhodesia under
the premier ship of Ian Smith declared the country independent. ^^ The unilateral
declaration of independence was promptly condemned by the U.N., ^^ and caused
the Security Council to recommend sanctions against the regime that professed to
constitute the government of the territory. ^^
The Sanctions resolution called upon states, inter alia, not to recognize or
to uphold diplomatic or other relations with the "illegal authority" in Southern
Rhodesia, and furthermore, not to assist or encourage the "illegal regime" and the
I'S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961).
^^.1. D. Van Der Vyver, Statehood in international laic, 5 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 9, 36-37
(1991).
'^Da.vid D. Caron, Tlic legitimacy of tlie collective authority of the Security Council, 87
Am. .T. Int'l L. 579 (1993).
'^"S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/20 (1965).
'^^S.C. Res. 217, U.N. SCOR, 20th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/20 (1965).
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"racist .settler ininority in Southern Rhodesia." Security Coiuk il Resolution 221
(19fiG) proclaimed positively that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to
the i)eace, '^"^ and was followed by Security Council Resolution 232, (196G) which
for the first time in the history of the U.N. imposed mandatory sanctions under
C'hai)ter VII of the U.N. Charter against a political community. ^^
Pursuant to Article 3!). the Security Council could characterize any extreme
viohition of human rights principles as a "threat to peace," and therefore inter-
vene in domestic situation which would potentially erupt into international con-
flicts. ^'^ The Security Council, by enacting Sanctions against the Ian Smith regime
in Southern Rhodesia, justified this intervention by characterizing these policies as
disturbance[s] of international peace" and "threat[s] to international peace and
security. ^''
The problem in Southern Rhodesia brought two particular issues onto the agenda
on non-recognition: The emphasis on racism in the composition and practices of the
"'illegal regime," and the question of self-determination of peoples. ^^ The right of
the people of Southern Rhodesia "to determine their own future" was mentioned in
paragraph 7 of Security C'ouncil Resolution 217 (1965) and reiterated in paragraph 4
of Security Council Resolution 232 (1966). The Rhodesian problem came to a happy
ending with Security Council Resolution 460 (1977), in which the Security Council
ai)plauded the Lancaster House Agreement which culminated in the independence
of Zimbabwe in 1980, and terminated the mandatory sanctions. ^^
^^S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R.es/221 (1966).
"S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/232 (1966).
Mark R.. Hutchinson, Restoriiiy hope: U.N. Security Council lesolutions Jot Somalia
aiul an expanded doctrine of Humanitarian intervention, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 636 (1993).
'Barbara M. Tocker, Intervention in the Yugoslav civil war: The United Nations' right
to create an international criminal tribunal., 12 Dick .J. Int'l L. 541 (1994).
^"Vyver, supra note 18, at 38.
2^S.C. Res. 460, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/460 (1979).
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5.3.3 The South African Homeland States
Puisuaiit to the policy of apartheid, the South African government demarcated a
total ten regions in the eount ry as "homelands" (initially they were called "Bantus-
ta.ns" ) for ethnically dehned sections of the Black (African) population. '^^ The II. N.
refused to recognize the "independence" of all those territories that applied to the
South African government of "independence" and were granted that status. -^'^ In
Resolution 417 (1977), the Security Coimcil called on South Africa to "[ajbolish the
policy of bantustanization, abolish the policy of apartheid and ensure majority rule
l)a,sed on justice and equality." ^^
The President of the Security Council, at the 2168th meeting of the Council on
September 21, 1979, made the following statement: '^^
The Security Council calls upon all Governments to deny any form of
recognition to the so-called "independent" bantustans, to refrain from
any dealing with them and to reject travel documents issued by them, and
urges all Member Governments to take effective measures to prohibit all
individuals, corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction
from having any dealings with the so-called "independent" bantustans.
Non-recognition of the homeland states was prompted by considerations founded
on the right to self-determination and the international censure of racial discrimina-
tion and apartheid, and here too, there might soon emerge a happy ending. ^^
5.3.4 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Cy])rus became an independent state in 1960, and from the outset, suffered under
the rivalry of the deeply divided Greek and the Turkish factions of its population.
^'^Vyver, supra note 18, at 39.
'^'^Sd Henry .1. Richardson III, Constitutive questions in the negotiations for Namibiun
mdrprn.den.ce, 78 Arn. .J. Int'l L. 79 (1984).
*"S.C. Res. 417, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R,es/417 (1977).
^^U.N. Doc. S/13549, submitted at the 2168th meeting of the Security Council on Sept,
21, 1979.
^^Vyver, supia note 18, at 41.

Following rill abortive coup in lf)74, executed by the Cyprian National Cuaid and
backed by Greece, Turkey invaded the island by .sea and air with United States
siii)i)lied weapons and ecpiipment. "^^
The Security Council declared attempts to create the Turkish R.ejjublic ot
Northern Cyprus to be invalid, deplored the "purported secession" of that region,
and (ailed upon states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
<ind non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, while at the same time also urging
them not to recognize any Cyprian state other than the Republic of Cyprus. '^^
5.3.5 East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
Since its establishment on May 15, 1948, the state of Israel has been in constant
conflict with its Arab neighbors. Following the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel took
possession of East .Jerusalem and the territory west of the Jordan River, known as
the West Bank, which it had captured from Jordan and laid claim to the Golan
Heights, which was part of Syria. ^^
The Israeli government's claim to annex the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem
through municipal law was a violation of the fundamental rule of international law.
"One of the most basic elements in the law of self-defense is that it only authorizes a
defender to preserve its existing values and not to acquire those of an enemy, and the
consistent history provides convincing evidence of the expansion of Israeli perceived
interests or values as opposed to their conservation." ^"^
^'^Eugene T. Rossides, Cypiiu'i and the rule of law, 17 Syracuse J. Int'l & Com. 24 (1991).
^''vyver, supra note 18, at 43.
^''Id. at 45.
^''Martin Feinrider, The control of violence in an lebanese context, 77 Am. Soc"y Int'l
L. Pioc. 182-183 (1983).
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The U.N. lourifled its aunulinent of Israel's claim to the occupied territories on
the l)asic premise of contemporary international law, particularly, the use of force,
which is inadmissible.
5.3.G Kuwait
Ou August 2, 1990, Iracji military forces invaded Kuwait, unseated the Emir and
took contr(^l of the covuitry; on August 8, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait; on August
in. Iraxi instructed the foreign governments to close their embassies and consulates
in Kuwait by August 24; and on August 28, the 19th Iracji governorate. The Security
(x)uncil resjionded promptly and with unprecedented vigor to hack's unlawful acts
of aggression. ^^
The Security Council condemned Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and demanded
its immediate and unconditional withdrawal, "^^ imposed mandatory sanctions under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter against Iraq, affecting all trade with Iraq and
Kuwait, '^''^ declared the annexation of Kuwait "null and void", demanded that Iraq
rescind its declaration of the "merger" of the two countries, and called on all states
anfl institutions not to recognize the annexation and to refrain from any action that
might l)e interpreted as recognition of Iraq's claim to Kuwait, '^^ followed by such
other resolutions, and finally passed the Resolution 678, '*^ recalling Iraq's refusal to
comply with any of the above resolutions and allowing Iraq one final opportunity,
"as a pause of good will," to do so, paved the way for armed intervention under
article 42 of the U.N. Charter.
Lois E. Fielding, Maritime interception: Centerpiece of economic sanctions in the new
world order, 53 La. L. Rev. 1214 (1993).
^'^S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/660 (1990).
•'^'^S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/R.es/661 (1990).
'^"S.C. Res. 662 (1990) passed unanimously.

War einijtecl in the ])eisiaii Gulf on January Ki, 1991, when allied forces from
twenty-eight countries began the offensive authorized by Security C/'ouncil Resohition
()7S (1990) to liberate Kuwait. '^^ Non-recognition of the Iraqi claim to Kuwait is
clearly founded on the salient rule of international law against aggression.
On two occasions during the debate over Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council
ordered the Collective use of force in the name of international law and as authorized
by Chapter VII. '^^
The Charter moved beyond the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as the signatories renounced
not only their right to go to war, absent circumstances of individual or collective
self-defense, but their right to resort to the threat or use of force as well. These
proscriptions on aggression were to been forced through a systematic procedure
authorizing collective force against an aggressor nation. '^'^
5.3.7 Offensive Administration of a Foreign Territory
South West Africa, which was colonized by Germany in 1884, was awarded by the
latter, throvigh the Peace Treaty of Versailles, to South Africa to be administered
by her as "an integral portion of the Union of South Africa" in accordance with the
rules applicable to C Mandate territories. ''^ South Africa's administration of South
West Africa attracted the attention of the U.N., and this issue eventually culminated
in the termination by the General Assembly in 1966 and Security Council in 1969
'^'^Vyver, supra note 18, at 54.
'*'Cliristoi)her John Sabec, Tlic Security Council conies of aye: An Analysis of the
Intf rudfional letjal response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait^ 21 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
63 (1991). Sec John F. Miiri)hy, Whatever happened to the new world order? 19 S. 111. U.
L.J. 113 (1994).
''''Sal)ec, supra note 41.
"''Christian J. Gaxris, Bosnia and the limitations of international law, 34 Santa Clara
L. Rev. i();-;9. 1069-1070 (1994).
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of t he Maiuhite, and t'ollovviug a further lengthy dispute, finally the independence of
Namihia, in March lf)!)0. ^''
South Africa's administration of Namibia implicated the right of the Namibian
people to choose how they would be governed-their right of self-determination, which
norm remains in constant tension with other rights and principles-the principles of
"sovereign equality, non-intervention, the non-use of force, and the maintenance of
territorial integrity and political independence." "*'
The Security Council, in Security Council Resolution 264 (1969), expressed the
opinion that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was "illegal and
contrary to the principles of the Charter and the previous decisions of the United
Nations and is detrimental to the interests of the population of the Territory and
those of the international community," and called on South Africa to withdraw its
administration from the territory.
It passed several Resolutions in this regard and finally passed Resolution 283
l)efore submitting the issue to the ICJ for advisory opinion, requesting all states
"to refrain from any relations - diplomatic, consular or otherwise - with South
Africa implying recognition of the authority of the Government of South Africa over
the Territory of Namibia," and called on all states that maintained diplomatic or
consular relations with South Africa to issue a formal declaration stating that they
do not recognize any authority of South Africa with regard to Namibia and consider
South Africa's continued presence in the territory to be illegal. "^^
'*'Sushnia Soni, Reyimcs foi- Nnniihia's independence: A Comparative study, 29 Coluni.
•T. Trausnat'l L. (1991).
^^S.C. Res. 283 U.N. SCOR. 25th Yr., U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970). See Geoffrey R..
Watson, Constitutionalizm, Judicial i-eview and the World Court, 34 Harv. Int'l L..J. 18
(1993).
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5.3.S The Iraq-Iran War and the War Against Iraqi Aggression
The 1980-88 IraqTran War and the 1990-91 War Against Iraqi Aggression, taken
together, have provided the context for the most frequent application since 1945
of the rules of international law relating to the rights at sea of neutrals during the
former war, and the application of maritime sanction to non-belligerents and others
during the latter. ''^
During the eight-year course of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, the two belliger-
ents attacked more than 400 commercial vessels, almost all of which were neutral-
state-flag merchant men. '''^'
No existing norm or international agreement gives a belligerent the right to open
fire on a merchant vessel flying a neutral flag merely because it is engaged in non-
neutral commerce, and attacks upon neutral merchant vessels simply because they
ventured into specified area of the high seas is invalid under International Law. ^^
The U.N. Security C'ouncil Resolution 661 (1990), adopted on August 6th under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, decided that all states shall prevent:
3. (a) the import into their territories of all commodities and products
originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the
present resolution; ....
(c) the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using
their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or
any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their terri-
tories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes,
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body
in Iraq or Kuwait
'^''^.Tohn H. McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The effect of two Gulf
Wars^ 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 631 (1991). Sec also David L. Peace, Major maritime events
in the Persian Gulf between 1984 f"^d 1991: A juridical analysis, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 546
(1091)..
''"Peace, supra note 49.
''Id.

Fuitliei resolutions ot the Security ('ouiiril clarified the situation with regard to
enforcing economic sanctions at sea. Paragraph 1 of Resolution 005 (1990) of August
was explicit in recording that the Security Council:
Calls upon those member states cooperating with the Government of
Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to sue su( h
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be neces-
sary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and
outward shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and desti-
nations and to insure strict implementation of the provisions related to
such shipping laid down in Resolution 661 (1990).
The Charter, in the abstract, limits the sovereignty of the membership of the
United Nations in a.t least two ways: first self- defense; and second, the Charter
gives the Security Council the power to commit forces collectively, in the name of all
members (Art 25) thereby denying member states their customary right to remain
neutral. Use of force by individual states is not permitted under Chapter VII of the
U.N. C'harter. Force could be used only under a U.N. force.
5.4 Preemptory rules of General International Law
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines a preemptory norm of general inter-
national law as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." ^'^ On the
international plane some of the provisions of the United Nations Charter have been
held to l)e jus Cogens, or fundamental norms against which other treaty or source
ol international law can derogate. ^'^o'
''^Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
""^George K. Walker, United States national security law and United Nations Peace-
kccjntuj or pcacaniakint] operations, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 447 (1994).

Therefore it could be argued that, pursuant to the Charter provisions, several
norms of inteniational law invoked by the U.N. and the I.C.J, in the above instances,
to wit:
(a) the prohibition of aggression and of the acquisition of territory by
means of force (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, East .Jerusalem
and other territories occupied by Israel, the Iraqi invasion and annexation
of Kuwait, and South Africa's continued presence in Namibia);
(b) denial of the right to self-determination (Katanga, Rhodesia, the
South African homeland states, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, East Jerusalem and other territories occupied by Israel, and
South Africa's administration of South West Africa/Namibia); and
(c) the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid(Rhodesia, the
South African homeland states, and South Africa's administration of
South West Africa/Namibia). ^"^
The above-mentioned norms are all preemptory rules of general international law
(jus cogens). ^^
5.5 Major procedural impediments to a proper implementation
Two major procedural impediments have historically limited the effectiveness of the
Security Council in responding to particular international conflicts: the veto power
of the five permanent members of the security Council, and the Council's failure to
take initiative in addressing international disputes. ^^
5.5.1 The Veto
The veto privilege guaranteed that no major action could be undertaken without
the consent of all five permanent members. The veto power remains one of the
most significant obstacles to the effective workings of the Security Council. ^' As a
'•''Vyver, supra note 18, at 65.
••'Vfi. See also J. DUGGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1987).
'''Sheiik, supra note 3, at 25().
•'"Gallant, supra p. 28 and note 10, at 899.

result of their special privilege, the five permanent members, with their disproixn-
tional power and singular interests, have precluded the Security Council from acting
according to the purposes of the United Nations. ""^ In other words, the veto j^ower
limited Security Council action in virtually all areas of international conflict. ^^
However, increasing respect for international conflict resolution, and decreased
East-West ])oIarization in the post-Cold War era have reduced partisan inclinations
and the number of conflicts that permanent members of the Security Council perceive
to a.ttect their vital interests, and facilitated consensus. ^"
5.5.2 Lack of Initiative
The second principal barrier to Security Council's effectiveness is that "in too many
international disputes, .... the Council has taken no initiative, but has waited .
. . . for somebody to submit the matter to it." ^^ Under many circumstances the
Security Council did not take an action on its own initiative. The problem was either
referred to by the Secretary General or any other member. The Security Council's
failure to take prompt and effective measure has been another major obstacle that
forestalled aiiv action.
•'''^Slienk, supia note 3, at 256.
''"W. at 258.
'''Id.

Chapter G
Conclusion
Maiiitenauce oi peace and security is the primary concern of today's world, and the
aLsohite responsibihty of ensuring world peace is placed on the Security Council. In
order to accomplish this goal, it is very crucial that the Security Council appropri-
ately interpret the applicable Charter principles of international law and effectively
enforce them.
The ('barter that grants enormous powers to the Security Council to carry out
this task, also sets forth the rules, methods and procedures, which are binding upon
the Security Council in its actions. Such limitations on its power has a great impact
on its functioning as a principal organ of the world organization.
Some of the Charter provisions, especially those that relate to the competence
and procedure of the Security Council itself, are quite vague and are open to various
interpretations. This also has had negative effects on the Security Council's fulfill-
ment of its tasks. The Security C'ouncil's preference for its own interpretation clearly
shows that it wishes to give an authoritative interpretation to the provisions of the
Charter in view of its primary responsibilities for the maintenance of international
peace and security. ^
Further, the Security C'ouncil does not strictly abide by procedure laid down by
the ('barter for handling disjnites. For instance, the Charter requires the Security
C^ouncil to refer legal disputes to the I.C.J., ^ but through out the history of the
^TAE JIN KAHNG, LAW, POLITICS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 232 (1969).
^U.N. Charter art. 36(3).
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Security Council, only rarely have these formal procedures of handling legal questions
heen followed.
The Security C-ouncil's function as a quasi-judicial body in interpreting and
applving international legal norms has been greatly criticized with respect to its
resolution of disputes involving the substantial rights and duties of the states and
interpretation of treaties. The Security Council ought to submit such disputes to the
International Court of Justice, a body more appropriate to perform such functions.
Since the Security Council is a political body, the interplay of law and politics
is another factor that hampers the Council's successful interpretation and imple-
mentation of the international legal principles. A review of the Security Council's
performance clearly show that it is politics which played a greater role in the Council.
Its impact is such that, even today, if any major power is directly involved in a dis-
pute or a situation, the Security Council becomes handicapped and could not take
any effective measures. However, in spite the fact that the task of interpretation
of the Charter and other norms of international law especially for a political body
like tlie Security C'ouncil is undoubtedly a complicated one, it is believed that the
Council's interpretation is greatly in conformity with the Charter and other princi-
ples of international law. '^
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, some of the Charter provisions that set forth
the legal principles are not clear and precise. This not only makes it difficult for the
Security Council to interpret them in accordance with the purpose and object of the
United Nations, but also gives the Security Council an opportunity to exercise its
discretion and misuse its powers.
Until the end of the Cold War, the performance of the Security Council regarding
enforcement of international law was very static and mostly unsuccessful, primarily
^Mathias .1. Herdegen, the '"Constitutionalization" of the UN Security System^ 27 Vand.
.1. Transnat'l L. 135 (1994).

(A)
because oi the political clashes between the major powers and the excessive use of
veto. Since then it has been acting with more vigor, dynamism and efficiency.
Most of the recent, and some of the past enforcement measures undertaken by
the Security Council have proved to be a great achievement. In such instances, the
Security Council, by its interpretation and implementation techniques, establishes a
stioiij; louudation of the relevant principle[s] of international law, which there upon
gain more emphasis and strength.
( Considering the above-mentioned factors together with other causes like, lack of
funds, lack of cooperation among the permanent members, etc., the Security Council
is justified in failing to prove to be very successful. Yet, the world must not lose
hope, because its strengths and powers can never be undermined.
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